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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3102(3)(j) and §78A-4-103(j) to review the final judgment signed by the District Court
which determined that Glen Weiser has no interest in his alleged property and dismissed
all of the claims for relief alleged in his complaint with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the District Court err when it determined that the effective date of a

claim under the Pre-emption Act of 1841 became effective only on the date the deed or
land patent was conveyed to the claimant as opposed to when the claim of preemption
was duly recorded and perfected on the land records of the Territory of Utah? (R. 151529; R. 2390-91; R. 2909.)
2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to receive evidence

proffered by Glen Weiser ("Weiser") at trial which would have established that Weiser's
predecessor-in-interest had lawfully exercised his right of preemption under the Preemption Act of 1841 before the Conditional Grant (relied upon by Appellee) was made
thereby establishing that the property which is the subject of this action (the "Property")
was not part of the "public lands" at the time the Conditional Grant was made to the Utah
Central Railroad, and that such an abuse of discretion is tantamount to reversible error?
(R. 2432; R 2436-37; R. 2534-41; R. 2909.)
3.

Did the District Court err when it reversed its prior summary judgment

made in favor of Weiser and determined that the Conditional Grant was effective and
binding on Weiser? (R. 2907-08.)
1

4.

Did the District Court err in concluding that the Conditional Grant

conveyed to the Utah Central Railroad was a limitedfee in Weiser's Property rather than
a right-of-way? If not, then did the District Court err in rejecting Weiser's reversionary
interest in the property once Union Pacific Railroad ("UP" or the "Railroad") conveyed
the Property to a third party? (R. 2138-40; R. 2390-97; R. 2905-08; R 2910-11.)
5.

Did the District Court err when it failed to give binding effect to the

judgment and decree quieting title previously signed and entered by the Second District
Court in 1935 which quieted title to the Property in favor of Weiser's predecessor? (R.
2133-36; R. 2147-49; R. 2909-11.)
6.

Did the District Court err when it applied the doctrine of stare decisis rather

than the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in deciding whether Weiser's
claims are barred by an adjudication made in a prior case in which Weiser was not a
party? (R. 2908; 2910-11.)
7.

Did the District Court err when it dismissed all of Weiser's claims for relief

with prejudice regarding the subject Property? (R. 140-43; R. 1030-34, 1037-10; R.
1041; R. 2911.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question of what date is the controlling date under the Pre-emption Act of
1841 for purposes of determining whether the Property was in the "public lands" and
therefore subject to the Conditional Grant is a matter of statutory construction. As such,
the issue presents a question of law which should be reviewed for correctness. See Reese
v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, Tf6. Regarding motions for summary judgment, an
2

"appellate court reviews a trial court's "legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of
summary judgment" for correctness,. . . and views "the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ys (citations omitted). The District Court's determination that the
doctrine ofstare decisis rather than the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
governed the binding effect of a prior decision in which Weiser was not a party is a legal
issue which must be reviewed for correctness. Id.; see also, State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6,

ffl[8-9&n.8.
Similarly, the District Court's rejection of the doctrine ofres judicata and the
binding effect of a final judgment and decree quieting title signed and entered by the
Second District Court in 1935 should also be reviewed by this Court for correctness. Id.
The District Court's conclusions as to the type of interest purportedly conveyed to the
Utah Central Railroad and the reversionary interests relating to the subject Property
should also be reviewed for correctness because this Court has stated that, "[a] quiet title
action necessarily involves an ultimate conclusion of law as to who owns the disputed
piece of property. In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, we accord them no
particular deference but review them for correctness." Falula Farms, Inc. v. Ludlow, 866
P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App. 1993). In Falula Farms, the issue was whether an initial
dedication of a county road in 1958 granted an easement or fee title to the county; and if
title was granted, then the issue was whether it was an absolute or defeasible fee.
Inherent in the issues facing the trial court was the right of reverter of the present owner
of the property subject to the dedication. Those issues were reviewed by the Utah Court
3

of Appeals for correctness, with no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions.
Id.
"The admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal question." Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ^[14. Such decisions are generally reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id;Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, IfljlO, 12.
Whether the rejection of Weiser's proffered evidence at trial was sufficient to reverse the
District Court's evidentiary ruling rests on the question of whether "it was substantial and
prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived in some manner of a full and fair
consideration of the disputed issues." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987).
In the instance of plain error, this Court may reverse the District Court's ruling
and remand for further proceedings. To establish plain error, a party must show the
following: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Tueller, 37 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Utah
App. 1990) {citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). Weiser
contends that the District Court created manifest error in failing to apply controlling law
on the issue of preemption and that it abused its discretion in failing to receive evidence
proffered at trial which established that the subject Property was not part of the "Public
Lands" at the time an alleged conveyance was made to the Utah Central Railroad. The
District Court's refusal to allow Weiser's evidence to be received into evidence was
sufficient to deny him a full and fair opportunity to address the primary issue that one of
his predecessor's in interest in the subject Property had perfected his rights in the
4

Property under the Pre-emption Act of 1841 well before the property was purportedly
conveyed to the Utah Central Railroad. Further, Weiser contends that in failing to
recognize the enforceability of a prior judgment and decree quieting title in favor of
Weiser's predecessor, and in erroneously applying the doctrine of stare decisis as
opposed to the doctrines of claim preclusion {res judicata) and issue preclusion
{collateral estoppel), the District Court committed plain error and that its Judgment
should be reversed and remanded.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Pre-Emption Act of 1841 (See Tab "P").
1870 Act of Congress, Conditional Grant
Utah Code of Civil Procedure §104-57-11 (1933)
Utah Code of Civil Procedure §104-57-12 (1933)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is a long enduring case arising from an action filed by
Glen C. Weiser ("Appellant" or "Weiser") against UP regarding a parcel of land located
in Davis County, Utah near the Salt Lake County line (the "Property"). In 1873,
Weiser's remote predecessor received title to the Property through a federal land grant.
The grant arose out a prior homestead or preemption claim that was filed under the Preemption Act of 1841.
In 1935, the District Court for Davis County entered a final judgment and decree
which quieted title to the Property in favor of one of Weiser's predecessors in interest.
5

At that time, the Railroad did not have any recorded interest against the Property on the
records of Davis County or the State of Utah. All persons not having a recorded interest
in the subject Property, including the Railroad, received notice of the quiet title action
through publication which was made in compliance with Utah law. In 1982, UP began
construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the Property. In 1987, Weiser discovered
UP's use of the Property and made written demand that UP surrender and vacate the
Property. Weiser obtained and provided UP a title report showing Weiser to be the
recorder owner of the Property in fee simple. UP refused to surrender and vacate the
Property and Weiser commenced this action to gain possession of and to quiet title to the
Property. Weiser also brought claims for trespass, unlawful detainer and damages
resulting from UP's continued use of and trespass of the Property.
UP defended the action claiming that its predecessor, Utah Central Railroad, was
granted a 400 foot wide "right of way through the public lands for the construction of a
railroad and telegraph" in March 1870 through a conditional grant (the "Grant" or
"Conditional Grant"). However, a condition of the Grant was that within three months
after its passage, the Utah Central Railroad had to file with the Secretary of Interior a
map approved by him "exhibiting the line of said company, as the same has been located
and constructed." The parties dispute whether this condition was fulfilled in a timely
manner. Weiser contends that the Utah Central Railroad did not timely file a certified
map accepted by the Secretary of the Interior and as such, the Utah Central Railroad's
grant of right-of-way failed. In 1995, the District Court initially granted partial summary
judgment in favor of Weiser finding that the evidence was undisputed that the Utah
6

Central Railroad had failed to comply with the conditions of the Grant. Subsequently,
and despite the undisputed facts reflecting that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to
comply with the Grant, the District Court altered its ruling when UP moved the court to
reconsider based on two historical cases addressing the validity of the Grant, albeit under
other circumstances and involving other parties. The District Court concluded that under
the doctrine of stare decisis, it was required to change its decision and reverse itself
despite the fact that the Court had found that the Utah Central Railroad had not complied
with the Conditional Grant. Thus, the Court granted UP partial summary judgment on
October 1, 2001 and determined that the Conditional Grant was valid based upon a prior
decision in a different case. Although the District Court acknowledged that even though
Weiser was not party to any of the prior cases, the District Court determined that Weiser
was bound by those decisions. The District Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the
doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel should be applied to determine
whether a prior decision is binding upon Weiser.
Weiser also contends that the Property was taken out of the public lands before the
Grant was executed because Weiser's original predecessor acquired the Property through
the doctrine of preemption under the Pre-emption Act of 1841. (See Tab P). This
occurred because Weiser's predecessor filed his Declaratory Statement of Preemption
under the Pre-emption Act of 1841 before approval of the Conditional Grant. Therefore,
Weiser contends the Property was not part of the "public lands" which were subject to the
Conditional Grant which purported to convey property to the Utah Central Railroad.
However, the District Court determined that the date of the land patent as distinguished
7

from the date that the Declaratory Statement of Preemption was recorded was the
controlling date for purposes of determining when the Property was part of the "public
lands." Thus, the District Court determined that the Property would have remained part
of the "public lands" despite the recording of a claim of preemption or homestead prior to
that time. Weiser also contends that the Decree Quieting Title to the subject Property,
which was entered by the Honorable Judge Pratt of the Second District Court of Davis
County in 1935, is binding and enforceable upon UP under the doctrines ofres judicata
and collateral estoppel

These doctrines are binding upon UP because UP had no

interest of record with the Davis County Recorder and was served in the action by means
of publication in accordance with Utah law. UP contends that the Decree Quieting Title
made by the Second District Court in favor of Weiser's predecessor was not binding upon
it because no action under state law can limit or circumscribe land rights granted to UP.
Weiser contends that quiet title actions can bind the rights of all persons claiming an
interest in the Property, that the Decree Quieting Title cannot be collaterally attacked by
UP in the present proceeding, and that the time for challenging the Decree Quieting Title
has long expired.
The District Court also concluded that the Conditional Grant conveyed a limited
fee interest in the Property despite the language in the Conditional Grant that a "right-ofway" was being conveyed. Ultimately, UP conveyed the Property to a third party by
quitclaim deed. Weiser asserts that if the conveyance of the Property to the Utah Central
Railroad was indeed a limited fee interest — as decreed by the District Court — the limited
fee should be deemed subject to reverter to the United States. Once the Property reverted
8

to the United States, the fee interest would have passed to Weiser through the land patent
given by the United States to Weiser's original predecessor-in-interest to the Property.
However, UP asserts that the Railroad did not intend to remise or release its interest in
the Property when it quitclaimed the Property to a third party, and that the conveyance of
its interest by quitclaim deed is not conclusive evidence of its intent to convey its interest
in the Property. Weiser disputes that assertion.
Course of Proceedings. This case was commenced in about 1991 by Weiser to
recover use and possession of the Property from UP. (R. 1-30.) The parties went through
extensive summary judgment proceedings, and in 1995 the District Court granted
Weiser's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pertaining to the invalidity of the
Conditional Grant and the Utah Central Railroad's failure to comply with the express
conditions of the Grant. (R. 639-48.) UP filed a Motion to Reconsider, which was
denied. (R. 649-99.) UP appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the
appeal. See Weiser v. Union Pacific R. Co., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997) (R. 708-12; and
see, Addendum Tab O). On October 19, 2000, UP filed another Motion for
Reconsideration based on two historical cases in which the court had concluded that the
Conditional Grant in regards to different landowners was valid. (R. 1315-46.) Weiser
objected to the motion as untimely and improper; nonetheless, the District Court
determined that it would consider the motion. (R. 1350-80; R. 1433.) The District Court
eventually reversed its prior ruling on October 1, 2001, and granted partial summary
judgment in favor of UP. (R. 1498-1514.) The District Court further addressed the
character of the Conditional Grant as one for a fee or limited fee interest. The District
9

Court ultimately concluded that UP owned the Property through a limited fee and not a
right-of-way. (R. 2910-11.)
On December 5, 2005, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing. (R. 24362502.) During the course of that hearing, the parties settled any claims relating to a very
small portion of property containing approximately 2,000 square feet and lying outside
the area allegedly subject to the Conditional Grant. However, the primary claims
remained unresolved. (R. 2436.) At the evidentiary hearing, the District Court rejected
Weiser's proffered evidence on the issue of preemption that would have established that
the Property was not part of the public lands at the time the Conditional Grant was made.
(R. 2446-2502.) The District Court denied admission of the evidence, deeming such
evidence irrelevant, based on his conclusion that preemption did not apply until the
preemption period had been completed rather than commenced. (R. 2945-end.)
Based upon the District Court's findings and conclusions on summary judgment,
and upon the parties' settlement of claims relating to the very small portion of property
lying outside the 400 foot wide right-of-way, the District Court issued its final order on
December 21, 2007. (R. 2903-13.) The District Court dismissed all of Weiser's claims
for relief, including his claims to quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages,
trespass and unjust enrichment. (R. 2911.) The District Court determined that UP had
received a "limited fee" rather than a right-of-way interest in the Property pursuant to the
Conditional Grant. (R. 2910-11.) The District Court decided that the limited fee interest
did not revert back to the United States when UP conveyed the Property to a third person

10

by quit claim deed, and therefore, the Property did not transfer to Weiser upon UP's
attempt to convey the Property to a third person. (R. 2911.)
Weiser filed his Notice of Appeal on January 18, 2008. (R. 2914-23.) UP filed a
Motion for Summary Disposition under Utah R. App. P. 10. Weiser opposed the motion,
and sought summary determination under Utah R. App. P. 10(e) to reverse the District
Court's Order as a result of manifest error. This Court denied both motions, and set the
matter for briefing.
Disposition of the District Court. Although it originally determined that there
was no dispute that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to comply with the Conditional
Grant, the District Court reversed its ruling when presented with UP's motion to
reconsider which presented two historical cases addressing the validity of the Conditional
Grant in regards to other landowners. (R. 1498-1514; R. 1605-06; R. 2394; R. 2907-08.)
The District Court determined that the doctrine of stare decisis compelled it to change its
decision to validate the Conditional Grant despite the undisputed facts reflecting that the
Utah Central Railroad failed to comply with the Conditional Grant. (R. 2907.) The
District Court acknowledged that Weiser (or his predecessors) was neither a party to the
lawsuits raised by UP to address the validity of the Conditional Grant nor was he
afforded an opportunity to present evidence or raise issues particular to the Property in
those cases. Nonetheless, the District Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the cases
should be analyzed under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that
neither doctrine applied to Weiser in this case. (R. 2907-08.)

11

The District Court also concluded that the Property was in the "public lands" for
purposes of the Conditional Grant, and that the Conditional Grant conveyed a fee or
limited fee interest in the Property to the Utah Central Railroad. (R. 2390-92; R. 2909.)
The District Court rejected Weiser's contention that the Property was not in the public
lands at the time of the Conditional Grant because Weiser's predecessor exercised his
preemption rights under the Pre-emption Act of 1841 well before the effective date of the
Conditional Grant. The Court determined that the controlling date was the patent date for
the preempted land, not the date when the Declaratory Statement of Preemption was
recorded. Because the Court determined that the controlling date was the date of the land
patent, the Court refused to receive written evidence and oral testimony proffered at trial
by the Davis County Surveyor pertaining to the fact that Weiser's property was not part
of the "public lands" at the time the Conditional Grant was made. (R. 2432-34; R. 24462502; R. 2908-09; R. 2945-end.) The District Court also rejected Weiser's contention
that the Conditional Grant, if it applied to the Property, only conveyed a right-of-way.
(R. 2391-92; R. 2908.) The Court ultimately determined that Weiser had no remaining
interest in the Property, and that the Property belonged to UP. (R. 2390-97; R. 2910-11.)
The Court also concluded that the 1935 Decree Quieting Title signed and entered by the
Second District Court was neither dispositive nor binding upon UP. The Court accepted
UP's argument that no proceeding under state law has the ability to limit or circumscribe
land rights granted to the Utah Central Railroad. (R. 2392; R. 2909-10.)

12

The District Court dismissed UP's alleged defense that it obtained the Property by
way of adverse possession. The Court determined that its ownership interest in the
Property was based solely on the Conditional Grant.1 (R. 2910-11.) Ultimately, the
District Court dismissed all of Weiser's claims and determined that UP's conveyance of
the Property to a third party did not cause the Property to revert to the United States and
then on to Weiser. (R. 2910.) The District Court's final judgment dismissing all of
Weiser's claims was made on December 21, 2007. (R. 2903-13.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and order and judgment in the District
Court's final judgment cites, in part, to the Utah Supreme Court's decision and sets forth
relevant facts as follows (R. 2903-13):
1.

This long enduring case arises from an action that was filed by

Glen C. Weiser (hereinafter the "Appellant" or "Weiser") against Union
Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter "[UP]" or "Railroad") regarding a
parcel of land located in Davis County, Utah near the Salt Lake County line
(hereinafter the "Property").
2.

A brief history of the case is given by the Supreme Court in Weiser

v. Union Pacific R. Co., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997)(Addendum, Tab O),
which provides, in part, as follows. "In 1873, Weiser's most remote
predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed land

1

UP has not appealed or challenged the District Court's determination that it did not
have a claim of adverse possession to the Property.
13

through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In
1935, the district court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed
property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Weiser's predecessors in interest. All
known entities with a possible claim to the property were made parties to
that action. The Railroad was not made a party because there was no public
record of its interest. The Railroad did receive constructive notice by
publication, however." Id. at 597.
3.

"In 1982, Union Pacific began construction of a semi-truck loading

facility on the disputed property. In 1987, Weiser discovered the
Railroad's use of the property and through counsel requested the Railroad
to surrender and vacate the property. The Railroad refused, and Weiser had
Associated Title Company prepare a title report, which showed that Weiser
owned the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand that the
Railroad surrender and vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused.
Weiser brought this action to gain possession of and to quiet title to the
property." Id. at 597.
4.

Union Pacific defended the action "contending that the United States

had granted its predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, a 400-footwide 'right-of-way through public lands for the construction of a railroad
and telegraph' in March of 1870. One of the conditions of the grant was
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that within three months after the passage of the 1870 Act,

the Railroad

file with the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him 'exhibiting the
line of said company, as the same has been located and constructed.5 The
parties dispute whether this condition was fulfilled. Weiser contends that
because the Railroad did not timely file a certified map that was accepted
by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroad's grant of right-of-way fails,
[footnote omitted]. After extensive research and historical analysis, the
trial court granted a partial summary judgment that the grant to the Railroad
failed for lack of condition." Id. at 597.
5.

Through extensive summary judgment proceedings, the Court

determined that the following facts relating to the parties' controversy were
undisputed:
(a)

The Act of Congress of December 15, 1870 (16 Stat.

395) (hereinafter "1870 Act"), which is relevant in this matter,
provides among other things as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the right
of way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted
to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under
the laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its
successors and assigns, for the construction of a railroad and
telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the territory of Utah,
to Salt Lake City, in said territory; ... Said way is granted to said
railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said
railroad where it may pass through the public domain ... Provided,
that within three months from the passage of this act the said Utah
The conditional right of way grant is referred to herein as the "Conditional Grant."
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Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the
Interior a map approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of
such company as the same has been located and constructed: ...
16 Stat. 395 (December 15, 1870).
(b)

The conditional 200 foot right of way grant pursuant to

the 1870 Act would overlap substantially all of Weiser's property
(hereinafter "Property") which is the subject of this action.
(c)

On March 7, 1871, a profile map was filed with the

office of the Secretary of the Interior by the Utah Central Railroad.
Union Pacific Railroad is a successor in interest to the Utah Central
Railroad.
(d)

On the following day, the map was rejected by the

Secretary of the Interior and returned to the Utah Central Railroad on
grounds that it was not certified.
(e)

On March 30, 1871, the Utah Central Railroad

resubmitted the profile map (presumably a certified map) which was
duly accepted by the Secretary of the Interior on that date.
(f)

The Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map

with the Secretary of the Interior within the time limitation set by
Congress in the 1870 Act.
(g)

In exchange for consideration, Weiser's predecessors

in interest received title to the Property by patent from the United
States Government on September 25, 187[3] [sic].
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(h)

Weiser's chain of title in the Property appears on the

record of the Davis County Recorder in which county the Property is
situated.
(i)

A right-of-way grant to the Utah Central Railroad,

which is at issue in this case, does not appear on any of the plat maps
recorded in the Davis County Recorder's Office.
(j)

Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have paid the

property taxes on the Property for at least the past 25 years,
(k)

Union Pacific made its first improvements and

enclosures on the Property when it commenced the construction of
the TOFC facility in 1982.
(1)

There is a disputed question of fact whether Union

Pacific Railroad and/or its predecessor's have paid property taxes on
the property.
(R. 2905-07.)
6.

The District Court granted Weiser's motion for partial

summary judgment pertaining to the land grant issue in 1995. (R. 639-48.)
The Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. (R. 649-99.) The motion
was denied. (R. 765.) Thereafter, an appeal was pursued by the Railroad
which was later dismissed by the Supreme Court. (R. 840-41; R. 911-12.)
On October 19, 2000, the Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration.
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Weiser objected to the motion as untimely and improper. The District
Court determined that it would consider the motion. (R. 2907.)
7.

Upon considering the Railroad's motion, the District Court

determined that despite its prior granting of partial summary judgment in
favor of Weiser, the doctrine of stare decisis required the District Court to
alter its prior ruling in the case. The District Court concluded that it was
compelled under the doctrine of stare decisis to change its decision despite
the fact that the undisputed facts reflected that the Utah Central Railroad
had failed to comply with the Conditional Grant. In making its decision,
the District Court acknowledged that Weiser was not a party to any of the
decisions cited by the District Court and was not afforded an opportunity to
present evidence or raise issues in those cases. (R. 2907.)
8.

The District Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the

District Court should have analyzed the issues in the case under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and that neither doctrine
was binding upon Weiser in this case. Based upon the District Court's
legal reasoning, the District Court reversed its prior summary judgment
made in favor of Weiser and granted the Railroad's motion for partial
summary judgment in its October 1, 2001 ruling. (R. 2908.)

3

The Court also concluded that Weiser lacked standing to challenge the Grant.
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9.

Based upon the District Court's amended ruling that the

Conditional Grant was valid, it addressed the character of the Grant. The
Grant provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of
way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to
the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the
laws of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its
successors and assigns, for the construction of a railroad and
telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the Territory of
Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory; and the right, power, and
authority is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public
lands adjacent to the line of said road material of earth, stone,
timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said way is
granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on
each side of said railroad where it may pass through the public
domain...
(R. 2908.)
10.

The District Court then concluded that the foregoing

conveyance conveyed a fee or limited fee interest in the Property to the
Railroad, and that Weiser has no remaining interest in the Property. The
Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Conditional Grant conveyed only
a right-of-way to the Utah Central Railroad. Consequently, the District
Court concluded that the subject Property was owned by the Railroad.4 (R.
2908.)

4

There was only a small part of the Property that was outside of the 400 foot right-ofway and the parties have settled any claim thereto.
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11.

However, the District Court concluded that the Property was

in fact part of the "public lands" at the time of the Conditional Grant was
approved by Congress. In making the foregoing determination, the District
Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Property was not taken out of the
public lands because Weiser's original predecessor (Tomlinson) had
acquired a preemption interest in the Property. Weiser contended that
Tomlinson's interest in the Property was superior to the Railroad's because
Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Pre-emption on April 17,
1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore
the Property was not part of the "public lands" at the time Congress
approved the Conditional Grant. Weiser contended that his position was
supported by case authority. The District Court rejected Weiser's
arguments and concluded that the period of time for perfecting an interest
in Property through the doctrine of preemption is determined by the date
that the final proof of preemption was completed on July 6, 1872 and not
on April 17, 1869 when Tomlinson's Declaratory Statement of Pre-emption
was made. Because the District Court concluded that the date of proof is
the controlling date for the purpose of determining when whether the
Property was part of the public lands, the District Court determined that the
evidence proffered by Weiser at an evidentiary hearing that Tomlinson
Declaration Statement was made on the public record on April 17, 1869
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Ibrfw (lie ( Ytmiilirirnl I Jmnl n \\\ uppun a) hv l '(ingress) wns HIT levant.

(R. 2909.)
1

°

The District Court also concluded that the Decree Quieting
in dm. HI u p VViser's pivdeccssni hs iln; huiilh I'll1.lint! Court is

not dispositive or binding upon the District Court's determination -h
Property belongs to the Railroad because no action under state law has the
ability to limit or circi lmsci ibe land rights granted to the Railroad. In
making this determination the District Court rejected Weiser's argi imeni lliiii
the Decree Quieting Title to the Property made by the honorable Judge Pratt
In. 1935 is binding and enforceable under the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel because the Railroad had no interest ofra/oul in llie
County Recorder and because the Railroad received constructive notice of the
qi net title action b) means of publication.
(R. 2909-10.)
13.

The District Court has also concluded that the conveyance of

its interest in the Property to another did not cause the Property to revert to
Weiser. TheDistrict Court also rejected llie itiy.tiiiiettf uisnl In, Weiser llnit
Union Pacific intended to remise or release its interest in the Property when
it

claimed its interest

inertv to another, and rejects the

assertion that the conveyance of its; \ '

( hv i|uiU'l:iini deed w.is

conclusive evidence, W eiser contended that if the conveyance of the
Property was a limited fee conveyance, the limited fee was made subject to
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reverter to the United States and thereafter passed to Weiser through his
chain of title stemming back to the original land patent given to Tomlinson.
(R.2910.)
14.

The District Court has determined that the Railroad did not

obtain any interest in the Property by way of adverse possession because it
did not satisfy the requirements needed to establish a claim of adverse
possession and that its ownership interest in the Property is based solely
upon the Conditional Grant. (R. 2910; and see, See Revised Findings of
Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order and Judgment, dated December 21,
2007 (the "Final Judgment") (Addendum , Tab A)ffll1-14).
15.

The only evidentiary hearing held before the District Court was a

bench trial conducted on December 5, 2005. (R. 2436-38; R. 2945-end.) (A copy
of the transcript of that hearing (hereinafter "Trial Trans.") is attached as
Addendum B and incorporated herein.)
16.

At the bench trial, Weiser proffered evidence that Weiser's

predecessor, Tomlinson, had filed his lawful Declaration of Preemption against
the subject Property before the Conditional Grant was enacted by Congress. (R.
2945-end.) Various documents were proffered into evidence by Weiser (R. 24462502), including but not limited to the following:5

5

Typed copies of many of the proffered documents were provided to the District Court
with the original documents to facilitate review of the ancient script written documents.
(R. 2432; and see, Addendum, Tabs D-F, K-L.)
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(a)

Declaration of Int z nti 3n to Become a Citizen of the

United States, dated May 3, 1869, (Addendum Tab D) (which was
proffei eel at trial as Exhibit 2).
i

rhe Pre-empt n HI < Vnlifinitc of Hiioiiias I luik'nck

Relating to George Tomlinson, dated May 3, 1869 (Addendum Tab
;; ^ was proffered at trial as I Exhibit 6) (a typed copy of the
document was

;JIM>

pntn iilnl In ilir Dislnil ( "niiil n ith llic utiginii!

document to facilitate review);
fr^

A purchase receipt regarding George Tomlinson, dated

Februa
Exhibit 7);
(d)

i,

, : ,:»*!->T- 742, dated Februarys 1872

(Addendw
(e)

I roll', red nl liiiil as hxhibii K),*
Note to the Commissioner General from Tomlinson,

dated February 6, 1872 (Addendum Tab H) (which was proffered at
trial as Hxl libit Or,
(f)
1

Call for patent, dated January 29, 1873 (Addendum

J (which was proffered at trial as Exhibit 10);
(g)

C M I* ' t\ I «J i \11iji 1 "iinf11ni I ,'iln ,1111 w I in In w ,is ( n o i l c r c d

at trial as Exhibit 11);

6

Addendum Tab G reflects and refers to the Declaratory Statement recorded by
Tomlinson on April 17,, 1869 See, Trial Trans, at 24-25.
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(h)

No. 742 Receiver's Receipt - George Tomlinson

(Addendum Tab K) (which was proffered at trial as Exhibit 12); and,
(i)

Proof of right of Pre-emption - Tomlinson, dated

July 6, 1872 (Addendum Tab L) (which was proffered at trial as
Exhibit 13).
17.

Based upon the District Court's findings and conclusions, the

District Court dismissed with prejudice all of Weiser's claims for relief alleged in
his complaint including his claims to quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble
damages, trespass and unjust enrichment. (R. 2911; Addendum Tab A at 4.)
18.

The District Court also determined that UP received a "limited fee"

interest in the subject Property pursuant to the Conditional Grant. (R. 2910-11;
and Addendum Tab A at 4.) The Court further determined that UP's limited fee
did not revert back to the United States and then transfer forward to Weiser when
UP purported to convey its interest in the Property to another. (R. 2911;
Addendum Tab A at 4.)
19.

On January 18, 2008, Weiser filed a Notice of Appeal with the

District Court. A copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached as Addendum Tab M.
(R.2914.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erred when it determined that the subject Property remained
part of the "public lands" until a land patent was conveyed by the United States. The
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()islrii I < 'outl '«. drri ^iimn w ;i i m, oulur\ It) applicable case law

I lit1 hopet'l) ceased In he

part of the "public lands" once Weiser's predecessor recorded his declaration of
preemption under the Pre-emption Act of 1841 and not when the ultimate land patent was
lihfii In liiiiii

I lir (iecl.'irfitioii ol precinplimi >\as liletl before llie Conditional Grant

which purported to convey UP a right-of-wa) across the "public lands" between Ogden
and Salt Lake. The District Court also abused its discretion when it refused to receive

showed that the appropriate preemption documents were duly recorded
subject Property was not part of the "public lands" at the time the Conditional Grant was
I
The District Court also erred when it reversed its prior summary judgmen

n

favor of Weiser and determined that UP had complied with the Conditional Grant
because the 1 Idjli ('cnlnil Kiiihoad failed lo file lis map wiiliiii llie tune imposed by
Congress, which restriction was binding upon the Secret <
which exceeded the authority conveyed by Congress in ilu < irant could be collaterally
allaeked as a uiiiiici of law.
The District Court also erred when it concluded that llie ('oiulilioual (innil
conveyed a "limited fee" (which it determined was equivalent to fee simple) rather than a
rigi11 111 \ \ tmi i

111\ * l 'I)i iII 111 II)1111 i 111,ii 11 11 \ i l»ii \\ 11 plain language purported to convey only

a right-of-way not a fee simple interest in Weiser's property. Moreover even If UP
received a limited fee rather than a right-of-way interest, the Property reverted back to
Weiser pui'sujiiil U\ In , Linl patutl when 1II' attempted to convey the Property to another.
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The District Court erred when it failed to give binding effect to the Decree
Quieting Title previously signed and entered by the Second District Court in favor of
Weiser's predecessor. UP is bound by the Decree Quieting Title under the doctrine of res
judicata or collateral estoppel because it was served with process by publication because
UP did not have interest of record that was recorded against the Property. The Decree
Quieting Title has been a matter of public record in Davis County since 1935 and has
never been collaterally attacked. The Decree Quieting Title should be binding and
enforceable on all persons as a matter of law.
The District Court erred when it determined that the doctrine of stare decisis
rather than the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine when a person
is bound by an adjudication made in a prior case. Under the doctrines ofres judicata and
collateral estoppel, Weiser was not bound by decisions made in one or more prior cases
in which he was not a party.
The District Court erred when it dismissed the claims for relief alleged in Weiser's
complaint with prejudice because if the District Court is reversed on one or more of the
following mutually exclusive grounds, Weiser's complaint does state claims for relief in
forcible detainer, trespass to property, restitution of possession and unjust enrichment.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION DETERMINES THE OWNERSHIP
OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY
On April 17, 1869, and prior to passage of the 1870 Act of Congress, (Le9 the

Conditional Grant) Weiser's predecessor-in-interest, George Tomlinson, acquired the
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h'operlv ill isMU' iiiiiiuicir NIP I'm -htnpiioti At l nil IS 11 l»\ liiiM i i milling his Declaratory
Statement with the Land Office of the Utah Territory. (See Addendum Tab G, and see
Trial Trans, at 24-25.) Tomlinson's patent to the Property, how ever, 'was not received
linni 1111 I jiiil I lllii I i in ml i I September J/> IK/' i lollowing I omlinson's steps to prove his
preemption in accordance with the Pre-Emption Act of 1 OH- i.

:

<•

At the bench trial, the District Court: refi lsed to receive evidence of Tomlinson's
preempt u »«f Iba JIISC liu" I iisli ml ( 01 u t considered the patent date as the relevant date for
preemption under the 1841 Act.9 Therefore, the District Coi it I: determined that e vidence
of preemption was irrelevant to the proceedings since the 1870 Act predated what the
District Court considered to be the operable date of the preemption - that is5 the patent
date. See Final Judgment (Tab

• alsc

This Issue is critical insofar as the District Court failed to receive proffered
evidence on the preemption issue to determine whether the Property was indeed part of

the public lands prior to the passage of the Conditional Grant by Tomlinson's exercise of
his right of preemption in 1869

7

The Preemption Act of 1841 is attached as Tab P, the Addendum which is attached, at
the end of the Amended Brief The relevant section of the Preemption Act is § 10.
Although the District Court refused admission of the evidence and sustained the
Railroad's objection, it did allow proffering of the evidence. (Bench Trial Trans., at 1965.) "That testimony then that - up to this point is considered to be part of the proffer, is
not to be considered by this Court in resolution of the issue that is before the Court at this
time, but will be part of the record for any purpose subsequent to this." (Id, at 65,1.610.)
9
See Bench Trial Trans, at 19.
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The 1870 Act provides, "[b]e it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the right of
way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central
Railroad Company,...." (1870 Act) (emphasis added). "What is meant by 'public lands'
is well settled. . . . The words 'public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to
describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws." Union Pacific
Railroad Company v. Harris, 215 U.S. 386, 388 (1910). Thus, if the Property owned by
Tomlinson was not part of the public lands in 1870 when the Conditional Land Grant
passed due to his exercise of preemption rights, the Property was excluded from the
Conditional Grant. In that event, the validity of the 1870 Act is irrelevant since the
Property would not have been subject to the Conditional Grant. Furthermore, if Weiser is
determined to be correct in regards to the preemption issue, UP's claim to the Property,
which rests on the validity of the Grant, is irrelevant because the Grant applied only to
"public lands."
The District Court's ruling on the preemption issue, and its refusal to receive the
proffered evidence of preemption was erroneous. Under applicable law, all that was
necessary to except a tract of land from the Grant was Tomlinson's filing of the
Declaratory Statement with the local land office - which he did prior to the 1870 Act.
"Congress . . . has provided for the filing of [a declaratory statement] as the proper means
for an assertion on record of a claim under the preemption law, and that is all that is
necessary to except the landfrom the scope of the grant." Whitney v. Taylor, 158 U.S.
85, 96 (1895) (emphasis added). A "declaratory statement is indispensably necessary to
28

pive fhr Hmiviiml M"

'IIHUIMII'

,is n priM:iiiplpi\" Tarfh^

,

'«" ' > N, .il 225, citing lf/iitfiey

v, Taylor, 158 U.S. %5\Lansdale v. Daniels, 100 U.S. 1 ^ , **6. The land office's
"acceptance of such declaratory statement, and noting the same on the books of the local
.6
(emphasis added). At that point, the respective rights of the railroad and the settler is
determined by record evidence,
A proper Interpretation of the acts of Congress making railroad grants , . ,
requires that the relative rights of the [Railroad] and an individual must be
determined. . . by record evidence, on the part the filing of the map in the
office of the Secretary of the Interior, and, on the other., the declaration or
entry in the local land office
Id. at 228 (emphasis added). Further, although the Railroad's rights shoi ild not be
defeated by oral testimony of occupation of a disputed tract of land long years after its
lillc seems upp.iH, mlv iixul mi Hit" KaKniatI, l li" also may not "question the validity or
propriety of the entry man's claim oi r •

>
:

It I II w its nol llir irilnil nl'Congress 1o

create controversy between the pre-emptor and the Railroad regarding the validity of the
jirc-emploi

S CLIIIII

H hitncy\ I !>8 U.S. al 94. "It was enough that the claim existed, and

the question of its validity was a matter to be sdlinl Julwirn lln; \iy>\ ernmcnl >nul I'll in
claimant, in respect to which the railroad company was not permitted to be heard."
laipey

I S 11 S jit .'.Vi nloiein ei, "[s]o long as [the declaratory statement] remains a

subsisting entry of record, whose legality has been passe I lpon b> the land author Ities,
and their action remains unreversed, it is such an appropriation of the tract as segregates
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it from the public domain, and therefore precludes it from subsequent grants." Whitney v.
Taylor, 158 U.S. 85, 93 (1895). The Whitney Court stated,
[W]hen on the records of the local land office there is an existing claim on
the part of an individual under the homestead or preemption law, which has
been recognized by the officers of the government and has not been
cancelled or set aside, the tract in respect to which that claim is existing is
excepted from the operation of a railroad land grant containing the ordinary
excepting clauses, and this notwithstanding such claim may not be
enforceable by the claimant, and is subject to cancellation by the
government at its own suggestion, or upon the application of other parties.
Id. at 94. Furthermore, "one who has taken land under the preemption or homestead law
acquires an equity of which he cannot be deprived by any individual under the like laws."
Harris, 215 U.S. at 389.
On July 17, 1868, by Congressional Act, §2, the Utah Territory was made a United
States Land District for both survey and registry purposes. 15 Stat. U.S. 91, §2. As of
that date, the Preemption Act, Homestead Act, and other federal laws extended over the
Utah Territory. Tarpey v. Madison, 53 P. 996, 997 (Utah 1898) (rev'd on other grounds,
Tarpey v. Madison, 178 U.S. 215 (1900). In or about April 1869, the United States
opened a Land Registry office in Salt Lake City. Tarpey, 178 U.S. 215, 216 (1900). The
Tomlinson land fell outside of Salt Lake City incorporated limits, and was thus subject to
preemption claims.10 Tomlinson settled the land at least as of 1865, and when the Land

1U

Cf. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 439 (Utah
1915) (in which a preemption claim in regards to the 1870 Act was rejected because the
lands claimed for preemption lay within the incorporated boundaries of Salt Lake City
and were therefore not subject to preemption at the time under the Pre-emption Act of
1941, notwithstanding the curative Pre-Emption Act of 1877). Tomlinson's land was not
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Office npetinf. lie filrtl h1, I). ilanttotv S-laleitiiu! anil pa.iJ In , application ice lo the Land
Office on April 23, 1869. (Trial Trans, at 62-64.) lomlinson settled the lai;

i

recorded his Declaratory Statement prior to the time when the Utah Central Railroad
i 'militant bc^aif lOiiMnirlaai ml its railroad lnn liuimi < >j.»ifeti lo Salt hake City. (Union.
Pacific's Memo, in Support of Motion for Summ. Disp.5 at fl of record herein )
Tomlinson preserved his preemption claim with his Declaratory Statement which
ine was commenced, and well over a year before
passage of the 1870 Conditional Grant. Thus,. Tomlinson's valid piveiupdoti elann as a
matter of record, preceded the 1870 Conditional Grant. As such, Tomlinson's claim
o verrides the Railroad's claim which, was based upon the Conditional Grant. Pursuant to
law, Tomlinson's (and therefore WeiserVi land was e:\eluiletl In mi Ilie Railryiatl's alleged
alleged right-of-way. See Whitney, 158 U.S. at 93-94. As such, the Property was not part
of the ' "public lan.^> ,., u A was not subject to the Conditional Grant by right of
preemption under federr^
has never been challenged by the Railroad, and evidence of the Land Office records and
related testimony are determinative of Weiser's claim to the Property. The evidence
proffered at trial, was elearh tvlnatm in Weiser's ownership inieresl in ihr Propetl), aim
the District Court should have received the evidence proffered by Weiser including the
testimony ol the Davis County Surveyor, Tn that regard, the District Court was in plain
error to have refused the evidence, and I'm (Iier, lo have ilelenuiiienl thai the operali'ie dale

within the incorporated limits of Salt Lake City, and was eligible for preemption n^ of the
date of Tomlinson's Declaratory Statement of April 23, 1869.
31

was the patent date rather than the declaratory statement date as provided by law. Thus,
this Court should reverse the final judgment of the District Court and remand the case to
the District Court on the preemption issue and for an adjudication of Weiser's claims.
II.

UNION PACIFIC DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONAL
GRANT
UP failed to comply with the express conditions of the Conditional Grant, and as

such, it was not entitled to the right of way over Weiser's Property. The conditions of the
Grant required that the Utah Central Railroad file its map with the Secretary of the
Interior by March 15, 1871, which the Railroad failed to do.
A.

UP Failed to Timely File its Map.

The first map filed by the Utah Central Railroad on March 7, 1871 was rejected by
the Secretary of the Interior. Fifteen days later, on March 30, 1871, the Utah Central
Railroad revised and refiied the map with the Secretary, and the map was approved. (See,
Tab Z.) However, the statute of limitations for acceptance of the map expired on
March 15, 1871. Notwithstanding, the Railroad contends that the Conditional Grant may
be interpreted to read that the map did not have to be approved by the March 15 deadline.
However, even if the Conditional Grant had such a provision (which it does not), the
journal is clear that the map which was received by the Secretary had not been revised
and refiied until after the March 30, 1871 deadline.
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B.

The Unaccepted Filing Was Not a Valid Filing.

UP has argued that the rejection of the first map by the Secretary constituted a
valid filing. However, there is no authority for that proposition.11 If the first filing had
been adequate, the Secretary would have approved the map. However, the map was not
approved on March 9, 1871 because it lacked necessary information required by law.
C.

The Limitations in the Conditional Grant Were Binding Upon the

Secretary.
The law is well settled that a Secretary of the United States or other administration
agency cannot alter, amend, or exceed the express limitations enacted by Congress. See
Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 27 L.Ed. 267 (1883) and progeny. Accordingly, a
Secretary must act within the statutory authority and limitation provided by Congress.
See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); Social Security
Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); Soconoy Vaccum Oil Co., Inc. v. United States,
44 C.C.P.A. 83 (1957).
The Conditional Grant had two time limitations. The first limitation (Conditional
Grant, Section I), required that a certified map be filed and approved by the Secretary
within three months. The second limitation (Conditional Grant, Section 4), required the
Utah Central Railroad to serve its formal certified acceptance upon the President of the
United States by March 15, 1871. The Conditional Grant expressly states that "if such
acceptance and service shall not be so made, this grant shall be void" (Conditional
11

If such a rationale were sound, a plaintiff could file a complaint with a stale claim and
then argue that the claim was enforceable, even though the statute of limitations had run,
because the clerk received the filing.
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Grant, emphasis added). There is surely no doubt that Congress did not intend for the
Conditional Grant to be valid unless the conditions therein were fulfilled.
D.

Any Action by the Secretary Which Exceeded the Authority Provided by
Congress May Be Collaterally Attacked.

UP asserted to the District Court that actions by the Secretary were binding and
could not be collaterally attacked. In support of its position, UP relied upon Rio Grande
Western Railway Co. v. Stringham, 110 P. 868 (Utah 1910) affd., 239 U.S. 44 (1915)
otimgNoblev. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 165(1893). However, in the Noble
case Union River Logging R. Co. filed a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the secretary of
interior from revoking a decision of the prior secretary of interior on grounds the prior
secretary was fraudulently induced to convey certain land. The United States Supreme
Court determined that the current secretary had no authority to annul the action of the
prior secretary who approved the location of a railroad. The Supreme Court held that
because the action by the secretary was within the secretary's power under the enabling
Act, the action was voidable as opposed to void, and not subject to collateral attack.
However, the Court went on to explain that if the Secretary had incorrectly certified lands
under a railroad grant beyond his power, the conveyance would be void ab initio and
subject to collateral attack in any proceeding. The Court stated:
In one class of cases it is held that, if the land attempted to be patented had
been reserved, or was at the time no part of the public domain, the land
department had no jurisdiction over it, and no power or authority to dispose
of it. In such cases its action in certifying the lands under a railroad
grant, or in issuing a patent, is not merely irregular, but absolutely
void, and may be shown to be so in any collateral proceeding.
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Noble, 147 U.S. at 174-75 (emphasis added). Here, the issue is not that the Secretary was
defrauded or abused his discretion in making a conveyance, but that he did not have the
power to make a conveyance to the Utah Central Railroad after the deadline imposed by
Congress had expired. Congress intended that the conditions in the Grant be absolute,
and expressed that intent by formulating a formal process of acceptance and service
expressly stating in the Grant that if the Utah Central Railroad failed to comply therewith,
the Grant would be void—not voidable. Conditional Grant, paragraph 5. Accordingly,
even if the Secretary had attempted to make an untimely conveyance to the Utah Central
Railroad (which he did not), the conveyance would have been void and subject to attack
in any collateral proceeding.
E.

UP Failed to Comply with the Express Requirements of the Conditional
Grant.

The March 30th receipt of the map by the Secretary did not constitute a waiver of
statutory deadline imposed by Congress. The Conditional Grant had several express
conditions including: a three month statute of limitation, the condition that the Utah
Central Railroad not charge the Government higher rates than individuals, and a
condition that the Utah Central Railroad not exercise certain state law powers. In
addition, the Grant expressly required, as a condition precedent, that a formal acceptance
had to be served upon the President of the United States within three months and that a
failure of condition would void the entire Grant. Section 4 provides:
SEC 4. And be it further enacted, That the acceptance of the terms,
conditions and impositions of this act, by the said Utah Central Railroad
Company, shall be signified in writing under the corporate seal of said
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Company, duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of
directors first had and obtained, which acceptance shall be made
within three months after the passage of this act, and shall be served on
the President of the United States; and if such acceptance and service
shall not be so made, this grant shall be void.
Conditional Grant, Section 4 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding, UP could not show
that the Utah Central Railroad had complied with these acceptance requirements.
In sum, no right-of-way was conveyed to the Utah Central Railroad because it
failed to comply with the strict requirements imposed by Congress.
III.

THE GRANT MADE TO THE UTAH CENTRAL RAILROAD
CONVEYED ONLY A RIGHT-OF-WAY
The conditional right-of-way document unambiguously provides that the Utah
19

Central Railroad was granted only a right-of-way across Weiser's property.

The Grant

provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way
through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the Utah
Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of the
legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns, for
the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden
If a contract is unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law. Fashion Place
Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 116 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah App. 1989). Federal courts also
construe unambiguous documents as a matter of law. Welch v. Unum Life Insurance
Company of America, 382 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Chiles v. Ceridian
Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1996). If the terms of a deed are unambiguous, the
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contract language, and
the deed can be interpreted as a matter of law. See WebBank v. American General
Annuity Serv., Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2002). A determination as to whether a
contract is clear and unambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the Court. See
Holladay Duplex management Co., L.L.C v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105 (Utah Ct. App.
2001); Tretheway v. Furstenau, 40 P.3d 641, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
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City, in the Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory; and the
right power, and authority is hereby given to said corporation to take from
the public lands adjacent to the line of said road material of earth, stone,
timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof Said way is granted to
said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of said
railroad where it may pass through the public domain . . . .
Id. The foregoing language is unambiguous that the conveyance was a right-of-way, and
not a fee grant, for several reasons. First, the language of the document is unambiguous
that it is conveying a right-of-way. See e.g. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355
Md. 110, 124, 733 A.2d 1055, 1062 (Md. App. 1999) ("it has generally been held by
courts . . . that 'deeds which in the grant clause convey a "right of way" are held to
convey an easement only.'). Second, the language in the document indicates that the
Utah Central Railroad had the right to take earth, stone, timber and so forth from the
ground. Had the conveyance been in fee simple, there would be no need for such
language. Third, in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 271 (1942),
the United States Supreme Court determined that if the language in a conveyance
document provides that it is conveying "the" right of way instead of "a" right of way, the
conveyance is simply a right-of-way. The high Court stated: "Section 1 indicates that
the right is one of passage since in grants 'the', not 'a', right of way through the public
lands of the United States." Id. at 271. Fourth, insofar as the document provides that
other railroads shall be entitled to use the land granted for purposes of a railroad, it is
apparent from the document itself that the conveyance was an easement only, and not a
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fee simple conveyance.

In Great Northern Ry, Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court

opined that such language is indeed indicative of a true right-of-way. Id. Finally, the
President of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant, conveyed to Weiser's predecessor,
George Tomlinson, a land patent in 1873. The patent was given because of Tomlinson's
preemption right. Surely, the President of the United States would not have conveyed a
patent to Tomlinson had the Property been conveyed previously to another.14 In sum,
the Grant conclusively demonstrates that the Utah Central Railroad was conveyed only a
right-of-way or easement across Weiser's Property. Thus, the Court should reverse the
District Court's conclusion that a limited fee interest was conveyed.
IV.

EVEN IF UNION PACIFIC RECEIVED A LIMITED FEE, THE
PROPERTY HAS REVERTED BACK TO WEISER
Before the United States Supreme Court clarified the law concerning rights-of-

way in Great Northern RY. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. (1942), it had been determined
that some of the grants given under the 1860 Acts conveyed a "limited fee" rather than a
"fee simple." Under prior law, the limited fee had an implied condition of reverter on the
failure of the grantee to use the land for the purposes stated in the grant. See Rio Grande
In the 1860 prior Act, courts were in disagreement on whether a right-of-way
conveyed more than a limited right-of-way. However, Congress changed its policy. To
make absolutely certain that a right-of-way could not be construed as anything but a
right-of-way, the House of Representative passed a resolution so declaring. See Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. at 274 {citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong, 2d
Sess., 1585(1872).
14

Black's Law Dictionary defines a right-of-way as follows: "Right-of-way. 1. A
persons' legal right, established by usage or by contract, to pass through grounds or
property owned by another. Cf. Easement. 2. The right to build and operate a railway
line or a highway on land belonging to another, or the land so used. 3. The right to take
precedence in traffic. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1326 (7th ed.).
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Western Railway Company v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 (1915). As such, even had the
Grant conveyed a fee interest to the Utah Central Railroad, such interest would have been
a "limited fee interest9' which had an implied condition of reverter. Thus, upon
termination of the use of the right-of-way by UP, the Property reverted back to the owner
of record. Because Weiser's predecessor had purchased the Property from the United
States and that predecessor received a land patent for the Property, Weiser now holds the
reversionary interest therein and he became the owner of the Property when an reverter
event was triggered. Thus, Weiser should still be the current owner of the Property even
had the original Grant conveyed a limited fee interest in the Property.15 Thus, if UP
received a limited fee interest rather than a right-of-way, this Court should reverse the
District Court and declare that Weiser is indeed the owner of the Property.
V.

THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT HAS HERETOFORE
DETERMINED OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
In 1935, Utah law provided that a person could bring legal action to determine his

interest in land and the purported claim or right of any other persons in such property.
Utah Code of Civil Procedure § 104-57-11 (1933). The Utah Code also required that
when such a proceeding was brought, the district court was required to receive evidence

15

Weiser also has marketable record title to the Property because Weiser had established
a chain of title to the Property on the records of Davis County for more than forty years
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 57-9-1 to 10. Weiser's Marketable Record Title is
dispositive of ownership because UP "REMISED, RELEASED and forever
QUITCLAIMED" any interest in the subject Property to another and cannot therefore
claim exemption from the Act on behalf of another.
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and make an affirmative finding and conclusion as to ownership and the rights and claims
of adverse parties. The relevant section of the Code provided as follows:
104-57-11. Id. Judgment on Default—Court Must Require Evidence—
Conclusiveness of Judgment.
When the summons has been served and the time for answering has
expired, the court shall proceed to hear the cause as in other cases, and shall
have jurisdiction to examine into and determine the legality of the
plaintiffs title and of the title and claims of all the defendants and of all
unknown persons, and to that end must not enter any judgment by default
against unknown defendants, but must in all cases require evidence of
plaintiffs title and possession and hear such evidence as may be offered
respecting the claims and title of any of the defendants, and must thereafter
enter judgment in accordance with the evidence and the law.
Utah Code of Civil Procedure § 104-57-11.16
In 1935, an action was brought in the Second District Court to quiet title to all
right, title, and interest in which Weiser's predecessor, Steenblik, had in the Property.
The action was brought against all persons claiming an interest in the Property. In
addition, action was brought against "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate, lien or interest in the real property described in the Complaint, adverse to the
plaintiffs Ownership, or any cloud upon the Plaintiffs title thereto." {See Decree
Quieting Title, Addendum Tab N.)
A hearing was held before the Second District Court on April 20, 1935 before the
Honorable Eugene E. Pratt, District Court Judge. At the hearing, the District Court
received evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff (plaintiff s predecessor)
concerning his ownership of the Property. The evidence was received as required by
Section 104-57-11 is now codified in Utah Code Ann. § 48-40-12.
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Utah law at that time. See Utah Code of Civil Procedure § 104-57-11, -12 (1933). At the
conclusion of the hearing, the District Court affirmatively made and entered its Decree
Quieting Title in the Property in favor of Mr. Steenblik. The District Court ordered,
adjudicated and decreed as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the title
of plaintiff in and to said hereinafter described property is good and valid
and the title of plaintiff thereto is adjudged to be quieted against all
claims and demands of the defendants or either of them, and the said
defendants and each of them are hereby enjoined and debarred from
asserting any claim whatsoever in and to said land, and premises or
any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff.
(Decree Quieting Title, Addendum Tab N, at 2) (emphasis added).
VI.

THE DECREE QUIETING TITLE IS RES JUDICATA AS TO
STEENBLIK'S OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY
The law is well settled that a final judgment made and entered in a case or

proceeding bars re-litigation of those same issues between the parties, their privies, or
assigns under the doctrine of res judicata. See In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use
of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 70 (Utah 1999) (doctrine ofres judicata bars the re-litigation
of claims which have been previously decided.)17 Accordingly,
[i]f the jurisdictional requisites are satisfied, the judgment or decree in a
quiet title action is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies with respect to all matters in issue that were or should have
The doctrine applies if the proceedings involved the same parties or their privies or
assigns, the claim sought to be barred was or could have been presented in the original
proceeding and the first proceeding resulted in a final judgment. 982 P.2d at 70. All
elements are met here. The case involves the assigns or privies of the same parties, all
issues pertaining to the rights in Property were or could have been addressed, and the first
proceeding resulted in a final judgment quieting title to the Property.
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been determined in the action or proceeding, and, under the rule of res
judicata, bars subsequent litigation between such persons based on the same
claim or cause of action [footnote omitted]. In other words, if all the parties
are brought before the court that can be brought before it, and it acts
properly according to rights that appear, there being no fraud or collusion,
its decision is conclusive as to the state of the title.
65 Am Jur 2d, Quieting Title, § 83 at 60 (conclusiveness; res judicata) (emphasis added).
Therefore, "[o]nce a judgment has been entered in a quiet title action, any attack on title
is collateral and impermissible." Id. § 84. The Utah Legislature canonized the common
law that a decree quieting title has a conclusive and binding effect upon all defendants in
the case whether they were served directly or by publication. Utah Code of Civil
Procedure § 104-57-11 (1933) provided as follows:
Service of summons on Unknown Parties - Conclusiveness of
Judgment.
Service of summons upon all the unknown defendants mentioned in
the proceeding section shall be made by publication in the manner provided
for the publication of summons in other civil actions. All such unknown
persons so served shall have the same rights as are provided by law in cases
of defendants named, upon whom service is made by publication, or
personally; and the action shall proceed against such unknown persons in
the manner as against the defendants who are named and upon whom
service is made by publication, and any such unknown person who has
or claims to have any right, title, estate, lien or interest in the said
property, which is a cloud on the title thereto, adverse to the plaintiff,
at the time of the commencement of the action, who has been duly
served as aforesaid, and anyone claiming under him, shall be
concluded by the judgment in such action, as effectually as if the action
were brought against such person by his name.
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Utah Code of Civil Procedure § 104-57-11 (1933) (emphasis added). Similarly, Utah
Code of Civil Procedure § 104-57-12 (1933) provides that the judgment in the proceeding
shall be conclusive against all persons who have been named. The section provides:
The judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the
summons and complaint who have been served and against all such
unknown persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been
served by publication.
Utah Code of Civil Procedure § 104-57-12 (1933) (emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing, the Decree Quieting Title made and entered by the
District Court in Steenblik's favor was indeed conclusive against all persons at that time
who claimed any interest in the Property. As a result, the Decree Quieting Title entered
by the Second District Court bars re-litigation of any alleged claim arising prior to 1935
which were or could have been raised in that litigation. The District Court's failure to
recognize the res judicata effect of the Decree Quieting Title entered by Judge Pratt in
1935 was plain error and should be reversed as a matter of law.
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECREE, WHICH HAS BEEN IN THE
PUBLIC RECORD SINCE 1935, HAS NEVER BEEN COLLATERALLY
ATTACKED
The Decree Quieting Title shows on its face that on April 22, 1935, Glen Day, the

County Clerk for Davis County and Ex-Offlcio Clerk of the District Court certified the
Decree of Judgment and abstracted and recorded the same on May 3, 1935 at 3:35 p.m.
{See Addendum N, at 2.) In addition, since the time the Decree was signed, entered,
abstracted and recorded on the public records, no one has brought action to challenge or
collaterally attack the Decree. UP does not dispute that the Decree Quieting Title has
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been a matter of public record since its entry. Therefore, the Decree Quieting Title is a
matter of public record and is therefore binding upon the world as a matter of law.
A.

Union Pacific May Not Collaterally Attack the Decree Quieting Title.

The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that generally a decree quieting title
cannot be collaterally attacked in a separate proceeding. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22, If 25, 70 P.3d 111,118. In the decision, the Supreme Court cites to the Utah Quiet
Title Act and concludes that decrees quieting title are considered to be conclusive. Thus,
UP could not collaterally attack the Decree Quieting Title before the District Court in this
action.
B.

The Statute of Limitations Precludes Collateral Attack on the Decree.

The applicable statute of limitations bars any collateral attack on the Decree
Quieting Title. The Decree Quieting Title was made by the Court on April 22, 1935 and
recorded on May 3, 1935. In addition to public notice given by the recording of the
Decree Quieting Title on the land records of Davis County, UP was given a copy of the
Decree Quieting Title in 1992 as part of this litigation. Since the time that notice of the
Decree was given to UP, no action has been brought to challenge the Decree Quieting
Title. The time for commencing an action has now expired. For example, if the Decree
Quieting Title were entered based upon some mistake, an action had to be commenced
within three years after such discovery. See Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26. If UP desired to
seek other equitable relief pertaining to the Decree, such a proceeding action had to be
commenced no later than four years. See Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P.
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995 (1915). Even if the statute of limitations were ten years, such time has long
expired.18 In sum, the Decree Quieting Title is binding and enforceable by Weiser.
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
STARE DECISIS TO REVERSE ITSELF ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In its motion to alter and amend the District Court's Summary Judgment decision
made in favor of Weiser, UP asserted — and the District Court agreed — that the decisions
in Moon v. Salt Lake County, 76 P.222 (Utah 1904), Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short
LineR. Co., 148P.439 (Utah 1914), and Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
246 U.S. 446 (1918) compelled the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. Weiser strongly
disagreed. Weiser argued that the Court should apply the doctrine of res judicata or
collateral estoppels and not the doctrine of stare decisis. Without question, the elements
needed for the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not satisfied.
Neither the plaintiff, nor his predecessors, were parties or privies to the Moon or Salt
Lake Investment cases, and therefore did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
and defend against the Railroad's claim to the subject Property. Specifically, Weiser did
not have the opportunity to produce dispositive evidence demonstrating that UP's
predecessors failed to timely file a valid map as required under the Act. See BlonderTonge Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 349-50
(1971) (patentee may assert validity of patent that was once determined invalid if he did
not have full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of patent in prior suit).

Indeed, when the parties argued before the Utah Supreme Court several years ago, the
chief justice queried why the Decree was not controlling.
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It is well settled that stare decisis relates to legal doctrines only. The doctrine
does not compel the same application of law when different facts are established. See
Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (5 Cir. 1993) ("a decision dependent upon
its underlying facts is not necessarily controlling precedent as to subsequent analysis of
the same question on different facts and a different record."); Lee v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 763 P.2d 567, 569 (Haw. 1988) (holding that while insurance policy
"stacking" was deemed to be permissible under one factual scenario, stacking was
inappropriate "when a factual variance" was introduced; Young v. Northern Terminals,
Inc., 290 A.2d 186, 188-89 (Vt. 1972) (what were determined to be proper attorney's fees
in one case is not binding on other cases); and In re Kina's Estate, 268N.Y.S.2d 131, 133
(N.Y. 1966) ("Each case rests upon its own facts...").
Notwithstanding, UP convinced the District Court that facts established in another
case are somehow binding over the undisputed facts determined by the District Court in
this case. However, such a holding applies only when the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel are applicable. However, neither doctrine is applicable in this case
because Weiser was never a party or privy to the two cases cited and relied upon by UP.
Thus, the factual determinations, if any, made in those cases are irrelevant to the factual
determinations made in this case. In re Kina's Estate, 268N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. 1966)
illustrates this principle. In Kina's Estate, a court-appointed referee recommended that
shares of an estate that had been bequeathed to a certain Polish National should be
deposited with the New York City Director of Finance, rather than being distributed
directly to the beneficiaries in Poland. The basis for the recommendation was that the
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Polish government had placed numerous restrictions on such distributions, which would
prevent the beneficiaries from the full use and enjoyment of funds. The Polish
beneficiaries opposed the recommendation, citing Matter of Tybus, in which a referee in a
similar case, determined that Polish beneficiaries would have full use and enjoyment of
the funds, and therefore recommended that the bequests at issue in that case be
distributed directly to the beneficiaries. 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. 1961). The Kina's
Estate beneficiaries argued that Tybus was binding precedent in Kina's Estate. The
Kina's Estate court found the contention to be "the most unusual legal concept," pointing
out that "[s]tare decisis relates to legal principles only." Specifically, the court stated:
The facts found in Tybus did not become a principle of law. There was no
issue of law in Tybus, and there is none in Kina; the law in both cases is
stated in Section 269-a of the Surrogate's Court Act, and there is no dispute
about this.
Kina's Estate at 133-34. (citations omitted).
Here, as in Kina's Estate, a factual determination as to the validity of HP's claim
to a parcel of property in a prior case is not a legal principle and does not rise to the level
of binding precedent. Rather, as in Kina's Estate, the law is not in dispute—it is set forth
clearly and precisely in the Conditional Grant of 1870. The District Court has already
interpreted that Grant and determined that the Utah Central Railroad did not comply with
the Grant. The issues in dispute are the facts and the legal results of those facts. Thus,
the District Court's application of stare decisis to reverse its prior summary judgment
despite its finding of undisputed facts to the contrary was plain error, and should be
reversed.
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IX.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED WEISER'S
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE
Weiser's state law claims are relevant to these proceedings. Under the doctrine of

preemption and the res judicata effect of the Decree Quieting Title, Weiser can establish
his interest in the Property as of the time UP unlawfully occupied it, and therefore his
complaint does state one or more valid claims for relief, as follows:
A.

Weiser's Complaint States a Claim For Relief In Forcible Detainer

A person who remains upon another's property after demand has been served upon
that person to vacate property is liable in forcible detainer. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-2
(1996) provides: Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and
keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was acquired
peaceably or otherwise; or
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real
property, unlawfully enters thereon and after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the meaning
of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlawful
entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands.
Id. (emphasis added). Each of the two foregoing requirements was satisfied for
the following reasons. First, it was undisputed that UP erected fences around the
Property (or other property surrounding the Property); and that UP used workers
and/or guards to control and restrict access to Weiser's Property. Second, it was
undisputed that UP entered on the Property in Weiser's absence and that UP failed
to surrender possession of the Property for years after Weiser's repeated demands.
Based upon the foregoing, if the Court determines that reversal is proper, UP may
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be liable in forcible detainer of the Property, as a matter of law. Therefore, the
District Court erred when it dismissed Weiser's claim for forcible detainer with
prejudice.
B.

Weiser's Complaint States a Claim for Relief In Trespass

Trespass is the intentional use of another's property without authorization or
privilege of law to do so without regard to harm. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
the "gist of an action in trespass to real property is the injury to the right of possession..."
Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 2445 494 P.2d 950, 952 (1972). Upon trespass, a land
owner is entitled to damages proximately caused by the trespass and damages merely to
reflect that Weiser is entitled to possession. Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah
1984). In addition, punitive damages may be awarded when a defendant's conduct
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of
others. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(a) (1992).
UP has intentionally interfered with Weiser's right to possess his Property. UP's
conduct manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of Weiser's
rights in his Property. Consequently, if the District Court is reversed, UP may be liable
in trespass and for punitive damages to Weiser as a matter of law.
C.

Weiser's Complaint States An Alternative Claim for Unjust Enrichment

"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to another." Restatement of Restitution § 1. The purpose of restitution is
to disgorge a defendant of benefits he wrongly and unjustly received. The Utah Supreme
Court indorsed the doctrine of restitution in Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984).
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See also, L & A Drywall Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., Inc., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980);
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947). The facts are undisputed that UP has
received benefits through the use of the Property since 1982, that UP has been aware of
that benefit, and it would be inequitable for UP not to pay Weiser fair value for the use of
his Property. Accordingly, UP may be liable to Weiser for the reasonable value of the
use of his Property, plus accrued interest thereon, as an alternative theory of relief in the
event this Court reverses the District Court for one or more of the reasons set forth above.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of the District
Court based upon one or more of the mutually exclusive grounds set above and should
remand the case back to the District Court with instructions that the Property belongs to
Weiser (or that the conveyance was only a right-of-way) and that Weiser be permitted to
pursue his claims for relief against UP.
Dated this &

day of October, 2008.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Bv: - ^ d J . ^ - g g
Steven W. Call
Co-Counsel for Appellant Glen Weiser
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1841.

hereby authorized to have the Sixth Census documents bound in a plain
mid substantial manner, the cost of which shall not exceed fifty cents
per volume; and that the amount thereof shall be paid out of any.
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall and may be lawful
for the marshal of the State of Maryland, and lie is hereby required,
under the direction of the Secretary of State, to. cause the number of
inhabitants within Montgomery county, in the State aforesaid, to be
again taken according to the directions of the act to which this is a
supplement, and the same to be returned before the first day of December next, and when so taken and returned shall be considered as the
correct enumeration "of the inhabitants of the said county: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall be deemed to release such marshal
and his assistants from the penalties contained in the act aforesaid: And
provided further, That no persons be included in the returns made
under the present act, unless such persons shall have been inhabitants
of the district for which such returns shall be made on the first day of
June, one thousand eight hundred and forty : And provided, also, That
the said corrected return shall not del&y the printing of the Census;
and that the said corrected return be printed by itself separately.
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APPROVED, September 1, 1841.
STATUTE I.

C B A P . XVI.—'Jin Act to impropriate the proceeds of the sales of the public lands,
and to grant pre-emption rights, (a)

Sept. 4, 1341.
Act of May 29,

Be it enacted by the Senate and Hovse of Representatives of the United1830, ch. 208.
States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the thirty- Certain Stales
to be paid 10 per
first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun- cent,
on neU
dred and forty-one, there be allowed and paid to each of the States of proceeds of
sales
of
public
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arlands therein,
kansas, and Michigan, over and above what each of the said States is Sec.
entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between them and 1842. ch. 270, $
the United States, upon their admission into the Union, the sum of ten 30.
per centum upon the nctt proceeds of the sales of the public lands,
which, subsequent to the day aforesaid, shall be made within the limits
of each of said States respectively: Provided, That the sum so allowed Proviso.
to the said States, respectively, shall be in no wise affected or diminished on account of any sums which have been heretofore, or shall be
hereafter, applied to the construction or continuance of the Cumberland
road, but that the disbursements for the said road shall remain, as heretofore, chargeable on the two per centum fund provided for by compacts
with several of the said Slates.
After deductSEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That after deducting the said ing
said 10 per
ten per centum, and what, by the compacts aforesaid, has heretofore cent. &c. resibeen allowed to the States aforesaid, the residue of the nett proceeds, due to be diviamong the
which nett proceeds shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross ded
States, &c. o
proceeds all the expenditures of the year for the following objects: the Union;
salaries and expenses on account of the General Land Office; expenses how.
foT surveying public lands; salaries and expenses in the surveyor general's
offices; salaries, commissions, and allowances to the registers and receivers; the five per centum to new States, of all the public lands of the
United States, wherever situated, which shall be sold subsequent to the
said thirty-first day of December, shall be divided among the twenty-six
States of the Union and the District of Columbia, and the Territories
of Wisconsin, Iowa, and Florida, according to their respective federal To be applied
representative population as ascertained by the last census, to be applied as the Legislatures may diby the Legislatures of the said States to such purposes as the said Legis- rect.
latures may direct: Provided, That the distribut ve share to which the Proviso.
(ff) See notes to the act of May 29, 1830, chap. 308.1848, ch- 86.
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District of Columbia shall be entitled* shall be applied to free schools,
or education in some other form, as Congress may direct: And yro*
Proviso.
aided, also, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to the
prejudice of future applications for a reduction of the price of the public
lands, or to the prejudice of applications for a transfer of the public
lands, on reasonable terms, to the States within which they lie, or to
make such future disposition of the public lands, or any part thereof, as
Congress may deem* expedient*
SEC. 3, And be it further enacted, That the several sums of moneyNett proceeds
of sales of pub- received- in the Treasury as the nett proceeds of the sales of the public
lic lands, paya- lands shall be paid authe Treasury half yearly on thefirstday of January
ble at the Treasury half yearly, and July in each year, daring the operation of this act, to such person
to w hornor persons as the respective Legislatures of the said States and Territories, or the Governors thereof, in case the Legislatures shall have made
no such appointment, shall authorize and direct to receive the same.
SEC, 4. And be it further enacted, That any sum of money, which
Money due
and payable by at any time may become due, and payable to any State of the Union, or
this act to b«
first applied to to the District of Columbia, by virtue of this act, as the portion of the
said Stale or District, of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands,
payments of
debts due 17. S. shall he first applied to the payment of any debt, due, and payable from
the said State or District, to the United States: Provided, That this
Proviso*
shall not be construed to extend to the suras deposited with the States
under the act of Congress of twenty-third June, eighteen hundred and
Act of June
23,1836, ch.115. thirty-six, entitled " an act to regulate the deposites of the public money," nor to any sums apparently due to the United States as balances
of debts growing out of the transactions of the Revolutionary war.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue and
Length of continuation of this be in force until otherwise provided by law, unless the United States
act.
shall become involved in war with any foreign Power, in which event,
184&, ch. 61.
from the commencement of hostilities, this act shall be suspended during
Proviso.
the continuance of such war: Provided, nevertheless, That if, prior to
the expiration of this act, any new State or States shall be admitted into
the Union, there be assigned to such new State or States, the proportion
of the proceeds accruing after their admission into the Union, to which
such State or Slates may be entitled, upon the principles of this act, togetlier with what such State or States may be entitled to by virtue of
compacts to be made on their admission into the Union.
-No! less than
SEC. 6, And be U further enacted, That there shall be aimtinDy
$ 150,000 to be appropriated for completing the surveys of said lands, a sum not less
appropriated
than one hundred and fifty thousand dollars j and the minimum price
nnminliy for
surveys.
at which the public lands are now sold at private sale shall not be increased, unless Congress shall think proper to grant alternate sections
along the line of any canal or other internal improvement, and at the
same time to increase the minimum price of the sections reserved; and
in case the same shall be increased by law, except as aforesaid, at any
time during the operation of this act, then so much of this act as provides that the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands shall be distributed among the several States, shall, from and after the increase of
the minimum price thereof, cease and become utterly null and of no
effect, any thing in this act to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided,
Proviso.
That if, at any time during the existence of this act, there shall be an
imposition of duties on imports inconsistent with the provisions of the
act
of March second one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, enAct of Match
2t 1833, ch. 55. titled, " An act to modify the act of the fourteenth of July one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-two, and all other acts imposing duties on imports," and beyond the rate of duty fixed by that act, to wit; twenty
per cent, on the value of such imports, or any of them, then the distribution provided in this act shall be suspended and shall so continue
until this cause of its suspension shall he removed, and when removed^
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if not prevented by other provisions of this act, such distribution shall
be resumed.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Trea- Certain bind
(iftd
sury may continue any land district in which is situated the seat of districts
land office's may
government of any one of the States, and may continue the land office be cumin ucd.
in such district, notwithstanding the quantity of land unsold in such
district may not amount to one hundred thousand acres, when, in his
opinion, such continuance may be required by public convenience, or in
order to close the land system in such State at a convenient point, under
the provisions of the act on that subject, approved twelfth June, one
lB40,€h.3&
thousand eight hundred and forty.
SEC. S. And be it further enacted, That there shall be granted to Grant of land
each State specified in the first section of this act five hundred thou- to States for in*
temal improvesand acres of land for purposes of internal improvement: Provided, ments.
thai to each of the said States which lias already received grants for Pro VIED.
said purposes, there is hereby granted no more than a quantity of land
which shaJJ, together with the amount such State has already received
as aforesaid, make five hundred thousand acres, the selections in all of
the said States, to be made within their limits respectively in such manner as the Legislatures thereof shall direct; and located in parcels conformably to sectional divisions and subdivisions, of not less than three
hundred and twenty acres in any one location, on any public land except such as is or may be reserved from sale by any law of Congress or
proclamation of the President of the United States, which said locations
may be made at any time after the lands of the United States in said
States respectively, shall have been surveyed according to existing laws.
And there shall be and hereby is, granted to each new State that shall Grant to new
be hereafter admitted into the Union, upon such admission, so much States that shall
be adland as, including such quantity as may have been granted to such Stale hereafter
mitted.
before its admission, and while under a Territorial Government, for purposes of internal improvement as aforesaid, as shall make five hundred
thousand acres of land, to be. selected and located as aforesaid.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted^Th^X the lands herein granted to Said lands tjot
the States above named shall not be disposed of at a price less than one to be fold.for
less than SI.25
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, until otherwise authorized by a per acre.
law of the United States; and the nctt proceeds of the sales of said Netl proceeds
lands shall be faithfully applied to objects of internal improvement with- to he applied to
interna* imin the States aforesaid, respectively, namely: Roads, railways, bridges, provements.
canals and improvement of water-courses, and draining of swamps; and Such rontfn,
such roads, railways, canals, bridges and wateT-courses, when made OT & c to be free
for transportaimproved, shall be free for the transportation of the United States mail, tion or U. S.
and munitions of war, and for the passage of their troops, without the mail, &c.
payment of any toll whatever.
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That from and after the passage After the passage of thid net,
of this act, every person being the head of a family, or widow, or single certain
persons
man, over the age of twentyone years, and being a citizen of the United authorized to
fcoier
160
notes
States, or having filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen,
at the minin. j m
as required by the naturalization laws, who since the first day of June, price.
A. D. eighteen • hundred and forty, has made or shnll hereafter make a
settlement in person on the public lands to which the Indian title had
been at the time of such settlement extinguished, and which has been,
or shall have been, surveyed prior thereto, and who shall inhabit and
improve the same, and who has or shall erect a dwelling thereon, shall
be, and is hereby, authorized to enter with the register of the- land
office for the district in which such land may lie, by legal subdivisions,
any number of acres not exceeding one hundred and sixty, or a quarter
section of land, to include the residence of such claimant, upon paying
.o the United States the minimum price of such land, subject, however,
to the following limitations and exceptions: N o person shall be entitled
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t o more than o n e pre-emptive riglit by virtue of thia n e t ; n o person who
is the proprietor o f three hundred and twenty acres of land in any
S t a t e or Territory of the United States, and n o person w h o shall quit or
abandon his r e s i d e n c e on his own laud to r e s i d e on the public land in
the same State or T e r r i t o r y , shall acquire any right of pre-emption
u n d e r this a c t ; no lauds included in any reservation, by any treaty, law,
or proclamation o f the F r e e d o m o f the United S t a t e s , or reserved for
saline*, or for other purposed; n o lands reserved for the support of
s c h o o l s , nor the lands acquired by either of the t w o last treaties with the
Miami tribe o f Indians in the til ate of Indiana, or w h i c h may be acquired of the W y a n d o t tribe o f Indiana in the S t a t e o f O h i o , or other
Indian reservation to w h i c h the title lias been or may be e x t i n g u i s h e d
by the United S t a t e s at any time d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n o f this a c t ; no
s e c t i o n s of land reserved lo the United Stat*:*, alternate to other sections
granted to any of the States far the construction of any canal, railroad,
or other public i m p r o v e m e n t ; n o sections or fractions of s e c t i o n s included within the limits o f any incorporated t o w n ; n o portions o f the
public l a n d s which h a v e been selected as the site fur a city or town ; no
parcel or lot o f laud actually settled and o c c u p i e d lor the purposes of
trade And not a g r i c u l t u r e ; and n o lands on w h i c h arc situated any
k n o w n salines or m i n e s , shall be liable to entry under and by virtue of
the provisions o f this act. xVnd s o m u c h of the proviso of the net of
t w e n t y - s e c o n d of J u n e , e i g h t e e n hundred and thirty-eight, or any ordejr
o f the President o f the United S t a t e s , as directs certain reservations to
be made in favor of certain c l a i m s under the treaty o f Dancing-rabbit
c r e e k , be> and the s a m e is hereby, repealed ; Provided,
T h a t s u c h repeal shall not affect any title to i\ny tract o f land s e c u r e d in virtue o f
said treaty,
S t c . 1 1. And be it further
enact* d% T h a t w h e n t w o or more persons
shall have settled on t h e s a m e quarter section o f land, the right of pree m p t i o n shall be in htm or her w h o made the first s e t t l e m e n t , provided
s u c h persons shall c o n f o r m to the other provisions of this a c t ; and all
questions as to the right of pre-emption arising b e t w e e n diifcreut settlers
shall be settled by the register and receiver of the district within which
the lutad is situated, subject to an appeal to and a revision by the S e c r e tary of the T r e a s u r y o f t h e United States.
SF.r\ 12- And he it further enacted, T h a t prior to any entries boiut?
made under and by virtue of the provisions of this act, proof o f the settlement and improvement thereby required, shall he made to the satisfaction of the register ami receiver of the land district in which s u c h
finds may lie, agreeably to s u c h rules as shall he proscribed by the S e cretary of the T r e a s u r y , w h o shall each be entitled to r e c e i v e fifty c e n t s
from eiieh i.pphcaiii for his scrvi«-««T o> hr» roudrred as aforesaid; ami
nil a*«ifiruuirnts »»'! transfers of the right hereby s e c u r e d , prior lo the
issuing? «>f the piitent, shall he null anil void.
Si:e. 1*1. And he it farther
ruartrd% T h a t before any person Hatmiusr
the benefit of this act *bdl be allowed to enter s u c h hinds, he or she
shall make o.-uh before the? receiver or register o f tlu* hind district in
which th" laud is situated, ( w h o are hereby authoi i/cil to administer
die ••:rn-\) tint n»» or *hn h:w never It id the benefi. of auv riurhi o f preemption under tin-* - ct ; that he or she t<* not the o w n e r of three hundred
and twenty at're* o f land in any S t a t e or T e r r i t o i y of the I'uited S t a t e s ,
nor hath he or fdin settled upon and improved said bun I to sell the same
on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his or her own exclusive use «ir brnHit ; mid that he or .«he has not, directly or indirectly,
made any agreement or contract, in .my vwiy «»r m a i m e r , with any person or person* whatsoever, by u htch the title w h i c h He or she miirht
acquire from tin* f I'overouienl o f the United S t a t e s , should pnure in
whole or in part, to tin? benefit of any person except h i m s e l f or herself;
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and if any person taking such oath shall swear falsely in the premises, Persons swearhe or she shall be subject to all die pains and penalties of perjury, and \nSfalsely,pei
shall forfeit the money which he or she may have paid for said laud, jury.
and all right and title to the same;' and any grant or conveyance which
he or she may have made', except in the hands of bona fide purchasers,
Duty of lha
for a valuable consideration, shall be null and void. And it shall be the officer
adminisduty of the officer administering such oath to file a certificate thereof in tering the oaih.
the public land office of such district, and to transmit a duplicate copy
to the General Land Office, either of which shall be good and sufficient
evidence that such oath was administered according to law.
SEC. 14. And be it further enacted, That this act shall not delay the Sale of lands
sale of any of the public lands of the United States beyond the time pot delayed by
which has been, or may be, appointed by the proclamation of the Presi- this act.
dent nor shall the provisions of this act be available to any person or
persons who shall Fail to make the proof and payment, and file the affidavit required before the day appointed for the commencement of the
sales as aforesaid.
SEC. 15. And be it further enacted, That whenever any person has Persons who
settled or shall settle and improve a tract of land, subject at the time of havo or may
certain
settlement to private entry, and shall intend to purchase the same under settle
lands with i
the provisions of this act, such person shall in the first case, within three tent to purchase
months after the passage of the same, and in the last within thirty days unde.r l£ia *?*,
next after the date of such settlement, file with the register of the proper wiihthe register
district a written statement, describing the land settled upon, and de- a statement,
claring the intention of such person to claim the same under the provisions of this act; and shall, where such settlement is already made,
within'twelve months after the passage of this act, and where it shall
hereafter be made, within the same period after the date of such settlement, make the proof, affidavit, and payment herein required; and if he
or she shall fail to file such written statement as aforesaid, or shall fail
to make such affidavit, proof, and payment, within the twelve months
aforesaid, the tract of land so settled and improved shall be subject to
the entry of any other purchaser.
SEC. 16. And be it further enacted, That the two per cent, of the nett The iwo per
of the nett
proceeds of the lands sold, or that may hereafter be sold, by the United cent,
>roceeda of
States in the State of Mississippi, since the first day of December, ands gold in
eighteen hundred and seventeen, and by the act entitled " An act to Mississippi
. -_
enable the people of the western part of the Mississippi Territory to c^mbe^lS)?"
form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of such &c relinquishState into the Union on an equal footing with the original States/1 and «d to Mississip^
all acts supplemental thereto reserved for the making of a road or roads pl*
leading to said State, be, and the same is hereby relinquished to the 1817, ch. 23.
State of Mississippi, payable in two equal instalments; the first to be
paid on the first of May, eighteen hundred and forty-two, and the other
on the first of May, eighteen hundred and forty-three, so far as the same
may then have accrued, and quarterly, as the same may. accrue, after
said period: Provided, That the Legislature of said State shall first pass Proviso.
an act, declaring their acceptance of said relinquishment in full of said
fund, accrued and accruing, and also embracing a provision, to be unalterable without the consent of Congress, that the whole of said two
per cent fund shall- be faithfully applied to the construction of a railroad, leading from Brandon, in the State of Mississippi, to the eastern
boundary of said State, in the direction, as near as may be, of the towns
of Sefma, Cahaba, and Montgomery, in the State of Alabama.
The two per
SEC. 17. And be it further enacted, That the two per cent of the nett cent, of the nett
proceeds of the lands sold by the United States, in the State of Alabama, proceeds of
sold in
since the first day of September, eighteen hundred and nineteen, ana* lands
Alabama, &c.
reserved by the act entitled "An act to enable the people of the Ala- JtJIJIKJUHS
„, to
relinquished
bama Territory to form a constitution and State government and for Alabama.
VOL. V.—58
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the admission of such State into the Union on an equal* footing with the
original States," for the making of a rond or roads leading to the said
State, be, and the same is hereby, relinquished to the said State of Ala*
bama, payable in two equal instalments, the first to be paid on the first
day of May, eighteen hundred and forty-two, and the other oh the first
day of May, eighteen hundred and forty-three, so far as the same may
then have accrued, and quarterly, as the same may thereafter accrue:
Provided, That the Legislature of said State shall first pass an act, declaring their acceptance of said relinquishment, and also embracing' a
provision,.to be unalterable without the consent of Congress, that the
whole of said two per cent, fund shall be faithfully applied, under the
direction of the Legislature of Alabama, to the connection, by some
means of internal improvement, of the navigable waters of the bay of
Mobile with the Tennessee river, and to the construction of a continuous line of internal improvements from a point on the Chattahoochie
river, opposite West Point, in Georgia, across the State of Alabama, in
a direction to Jackson in the State of Mississippi.
APPROVED, September 4, IS4I.

STATUTE I.

Sept. 9, 1841.
^Obsolete.]
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Proviso.

Fort9 at Annapolis.

CHAP. XVII.—Jin Act making appropriations for various fortification, for ord»
tiartcci and for preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative* of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums be,
and the same are hereby, appropriated, to be paid out of any money in
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, namely :
For repairs of West-head battery, Governor's island, Boston harbor,
five thousand dollars;
For repairs of Southeast battery, Governor's island, Boston harbor,
five thousand dollars;
For repairs of Fort Independence and sea-wall of Castle island, Boston harbor, 3ixty-five thousand dollars;
For Fort Warren, Boston harbor, one hundred and five thousand
dollars;
For repairs of old fort at New Bedford harbor, five thousand dollars;
For Fort Adams, Newport harbor, forty-five thousand dollars;
For fortifications in New London harbor—rebuilding of Fort Trumbull, Connecticut, thirty-five thousand dollars;
For repairs of old Fort Griswold, New London harbor, Connecticut,
ten thousand dollars;
For completing repairs of Fort Niagara, and greeting and repairing
necessary buildings therein, New York, twenty thousand dollars;
For completing repairs of Fort Ontario, Oswego, New York, and
erecting necessary buildings therein, fifteen thousand dollars;
For Fort Schuyler, New York harbor, seventy thousand dollars;
For repairs of Fort Wood and sea-wall, Bedlow's island, New York
harbor, fifty thousand dollars;
For permanent walls for Fort Columbus, Castle William and South
battery, Governor's island, New York harbor, twelve thousand dollars;
For repairs of sea-wall of Castle William and other parts of Governor's island, seven thousand dollars;
For Fort Delaware, Delaware river, provided the title to the Pea
Patch island shall be decided to be in the United States, including
twenty-two thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars carried to the
surplus fund, January first, eighteen hundred and forty-one, fifty thousand dollars;
For repairing forts at Annapolis harbor, Maryland, five thousand
dollars;

